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INFORMATION OVERLOAD:
PEACE OR WAR WITH THE COMPUTER
LESLIE T. WILKINS*
Will intelligent computers ever be able to
make better decisions than judges, parole boards,
probation officers and others concerned with the
offender? Can the provision of information by
rapid retrieval systems connected to large-scale
computers or information machines assist the
courts? Should we look for the take-over of the
human decision activities by automatic processes,
or for some form of cooperation between the
human decision-maker and the computer? Will
computers cooperate? Will decision-makers co-
operate?
The obvious answer is that human intelligence
will always have an essential part to play in de-
cision-making, no matter to what extent com-
puters can be designed to facilitate the processes
of information retrieval and analysis. Currently
many criminal justice procedures and decisions
could be assisted by the further utilization of
computers, but, in order to cooperate, both the
decision-makers and the computers must learn to
communicate. Computers can certainly be pro-
grammed to learn, but they must learn from some-
body. Considerable problems exist in organizing
materials so that optimal use can be made of the
computer and the particular strengths of human
intelligence.'
This paper is divided into three parts. The first
section considers certain general issues and some
questions which are somewhat abstract if not
"philosophical." Often the relevance of specific
issues can only be discovered by taking an ab-
stract viewpoint. The second part reports in sum-
mary form a number of recently conducted ex-
periments relating to parole and probation. Ap-
paratus which simulates the operations possible
on an up-to-date computer is used to examine the
interaction between the decision-maker and the
* Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State Uni-
versity of New York, Albany.
' This is by no means a new idea. The possibility of
cooperation between man and computer in relation to
decision-making has been discussed for more than a
decade. See, e.g., I.R.E. TRANsAcTIoNs ON HUMAN
FAcroRs iN ELEcTRoNics: H.F.E. 2 (1961); Yntema &
Torgerson, Mai-Computer Coordination in Decisions
Requiring Common Sense, in DEciSioN MAKiNO, 20-26(W. Edwards & A. Tversky, ed. 1967).
machine. Finally an attempt is made to draw
together the experimental evidence and the moral
and philosophical questions while focusing on the
present state of knowledge and process, and to
suggest means of improvement.
MoRE INFORMATION OR LESS?
Most decision-makers believe that if they are
given sufficient and correct facts they can make
the decision required of them. Many believe that
if their decision is somehow proved to be incor-
rect, the information was insufficient or inaccurate.
Seldom does the thought occur that the decision
might have been a poor one because there was too
much information for human intelligence to cope
with. The decision-making machinery within the
human skull can be overloaded just as any other
piece of machinery, and when it is overloaded it
fails to function as well as it might. A car indicates
by groans and wheezes when it is overloaded, but
no indicator seems to exist which advises the
human intelligence that it is attempting to handle
too much information at once. Only under experi-
mental conditions can it be shown that the human
intellect, no matter how intelligent the individual,
can process only very small quantities of informa-
tion.
Computer salesmen, not unexpectly, fail to
stress these findings when attempting to sell
equipment. Speed and quantity of information
retrieval are their watchwords. But rapid retrieval
may or may not be an asset of any information
system. Whatever goes into the computer has to
be put there, and whatever comes out has to be
interpreted by the human decision-maker. The
computer can tell neither whether a decision is
correct nor whether it is morally acceptable. We
may define "correctness" in terms of certain
operations which the computer can carry out, but
it is humans determining the logic who decide
whether a computer-made decision is "correct"
(consistent) or incorrect.
KrNDs OF DECISIONS
We have difficulty discussing issues of this
kind because our language is extremely imprecise.
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It is impossible, even with the most appropriate
choice of words, to express any complex concept
in such a way as to avoid the danger of ambiguity.
We talk about decisions and decision processes as
though all decisions were similar-a decision is a
decision. But consider just two examples of de-
cisions: the first, the President decides to go to
war; the second, I decide to wear a pink shirt.
Clearly these are two very different "things." But
different as the "things" are, we use the word
decision to cover both instances. If we use the
same word, we must infer that there is some
sense in which the "thing" is the same. If the
"thing" were totally different, surely a different
word would have been used.
Anthropologists tell us that people who live in
the Arctic have many different words which we
would translate as "snow." They have these
different words because it is necessary for them
to discriminate large flake snow from small powder,
and so on. In their experience the various qualities
of "snow" are so different that their language
has evolved different words. In our language of
decisions we have not found it necessary to dis-
criminate decisions with serious consequences
from decisions with trivial consequences in terms
of the noun which describes the activity we call
the "decision."
Is it possible to assume that the processes of
"coming to a decision" are sufficiently similar
whether the decision relates to trivial or extremely
serious matters? Is the difference in the two "de-
cisions" merely a matter of degree or magnitude?
Can we assume that any knowledge of the process
relating to the one kind of decision can be applied
to the other? Before we can consider these im-
portant questions we must break down the "de-
cision" process into some more useful categories
of operations.'
Is DECISrOl-MAMnG A PROCESS?
We have many words by which we refer to the
idea of a decision. We talk about "coming to" a de-
cision, using the analogy of a journey. There are
other such descriptive words: we may "cut off dis-
cussion" and "force a decision;" we may "weigh the
evidence;" we may "make" (the analogy of build-
2The ideas of utility, probability, and risky or
riskless decisions, which have been developed in the
field of decision research, do not help very much at this
point. The consequences for the decision-maker of the
President's decision to go to war may be less than the
wearing of a pink shirt by a job applicant, and it is not
very meaningful to ask whether the President would
prefer to go to war or to wear a pink shirt I
ing or constructing) a decision; and so on. Some of
the terms we use suggest that "making a decision"
is itself a process, while other terms suggest that
the making of a decision is not a process at all, but
rather the termination of a prior process of in-
formation search, retrieval and analysis; we say
we have "decided" when we no longer wish to
seek for more information. It is odd that our
language is so imprecise in describing such an
important process. We have a very poor collection
of analogues or metaphors to describe the decision
act or process or termination of a process, and
we do not discriminate, by the term "decision,"
the very different classes of the act.
Despite the lack of precision in our language we
generally assume that "information" is related to
"decision." Perhaps our language is not much
better at describing what constitutes "informa-
tion," but it is possible to utilize the operational
definitions of Shannon and others8 where necessary.
Other concepts are closely related to the idea of
"decision." We must examine some of these before
we can settle more precisely upon a description of
a "decision," and consider cooperation with the
computer in the "decision" situation. However,
let us first take the idea of information. We gen-
erally assume that a quantity of information exists,
in our minds or elsewhere, which is relevant to the
decision we are to make. This information may
be formally stored in records, or we may make
direct observations (e.g., the color of the shirt)
and think about possible situations (e.g., meetings
we may attend that day). We have a strategy of
search for the information; we may call for the
files or merely stop and think (recall and make
projections). Having obtained the information, or
while obtaining it, we will begin to "process" it,
relating one item to another and attaching certain
significance to each.
No one would assume that similar kinds of
information were of common utility in the case
of the decision to go to war and in the case of the
pink shirt. But this does not imply that the
"strategy of search" for information used in the
two cases might not be similar, nor does it follow
that the methods whereby the different kinds and
qualities of information are processed by human
intelligence are dissimilar. Do we "search for
facts" (what are "facts"?) in exactly the same
ways whatever the nature of the decision to be
made? Is the idea of the seriousness of a decision
2 See, e.g., C. SHANNON & W. WEAVER, TnE MA=ix-
mATicA. TimORy oF COmmuCATIoN (1949).
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a different consideration from the idea of the de-
cision? If we are to discuss the "seriousness" of a
decision, it is obvious that we shall need informa-
tion as to the likely consequences of the decision.
But is this not absurd? If we know only the conse-
quences of making the decision, we still have no
information by which to discuss its consequences
or its seriousness since we have to assume that the
consequences of deciding something different or
even deciding-not-to-decide may be either more
or less serious. Thus the idea of the seriousness of
the consequences of a decision implies some al-
ternatives are possible and that these can be
compared.
Leaving aside the idea of the seriousness or
triviality of some decisions, we may note a further
related consideration in the decision process or
act. We may say that we are quite confident
that a decision is correct, or we may lack con-
fidence in a decision. In some cases we may be
prepared to make a "decision" even though our
level of confidence is low, while in other cases
we would make strong efforts to increase our level
of confidence before "deciding." It is reasonable
to suppose that for those decisions which we re-
gard as trivial (e.g., the pink shirt case), we would
be prepared to act at a low level of confidence,
whereas in more serious cases we would want a
much higher degree of assurance before "de-
ciding." Thus it appears that there is a relation-
ship between the degree of confidence we require
in a decision and our assessment of the conse-
quences of the decision. We require higher de-
grees of assurance where large differences in al-
ternative outcomes rest upon our decisions. Thus
we arrive at the issue of probable outcomes, where
the emphasis is on the term "probable." The idea
of probability and the idea of degrees of assurance
or confidence may be taken as an identity.4 Thus
we may relate the perceived distance between
alternative probable outcomes to the degree of
confidence required before making a decision.
If the decision-maker wishes to increase the
level of confidence he may do more-of-the-same
or perhaps he might try something different.
In either event it seems reasonable to assume that
to increase a level of confidence more work will
In everyday language persons often say, "I believe
that..." meaning "I think it is probable that..."
However, a more formal association between "degrees
of belief" and probability is discussed in many texts on
theoretical statistics. See, e.g., I. GOOD, PROBABILITY
AND THE WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE (1950).
be required in some form. It is unlikely that less
activity on the part of the decision-maker would
result in a feeling of greater confidence. It makes
sense to view the "decision" as a termination of a
process of information search. We cannot rea-
sonably argue that a person has reached a de-
cision if that person persists in seeking further
information with regard to the act he must make
or fail to make. It is, of course, possible to termi-
nate the search for information while the level of
confidence in the "decision" is still low, but the
degree of confidence is a quality of a different
order from the "decision." Unless I am particu-
larly fastidious, the decision to wear a pink shirt
or not may be one where I do not require much in-
formation because I am satisfied with a low level
of confidence in the "decision." I may be satisfied
with a low level of confidence because I cannot
ascribe any serious consequences to making the
wrong decision. However, there are circumstances
where a person who is not fastidious with regard to
dress may require a higher level of confidence in a
decision regarding dress; for example, when going
for an important interview. The level of confidence
required is, in the first instance, related to the
qualities of or in the decision-maker, and in the
second case, related to the projected likely conse-
quences of his act within the external situation.
The preceding analysis does not throw any
light on the processes of information search them-
selves. In order to increase our level of confidence
we may do more of the same. If, however, we
assert that the process of information search
adopted in the trivial case must be different from
that of the serious case, then the question arises
as to how many different strategies of search the
human intelligence can apply and what determines
the adoption of one rather than the other? As the
old cooking recipes might say, first catch your
varieties of strategies: Whether there is one
strategy or many for information search, there is
still the further problem of the nature of informa-
tion processing within the human intellect. Are
there different forms of "information processing"
which we adopt depending upon either the serious-
ness of the decision or the strategy of information
search or both? How does human intelligence
utilize the information it collects and manage to
distil it into a decision? What is the process of
distillation? Does it closely follow procedures




DJECISIONS ABOUT THINGS AND PERSONS
In the judicial process there are many decision
branching points. Few of these decisions are
trivial. At each point where a decision is required
information is available to the decision-maker in a
stored form. Often persons in the legal or cor-
rectional fields discuss "making decisions about
individuals." Actually, a decision cannot be made
about an individual, but only about infornitiom
concerning that individual. The individual is
moved into one channel or another according to
the nature of the decision, but the decision-maker
cannot deal with more of the individual's char-
acteristics than he can ascertain by whatever
means are available to him. What happens to an
individual is determined not by his individual
characteristics, but rather by the characteristics of
the information sought about him and processed
in the mind of the decision-maker. This may seem
obvious, but the consequences of this obvious
situation are seldom recognize(]. We often claim
that offenders are dealt with in terms of their
individual needs, that each person is unique and
must he so considered in sentencing lrocedures,
or that there is a necessity on the part of the
decision-maker to consider the whole of the in-
formation about the offender. These statements
are not consistent with the earlier statement
which was said to be "obvious." How can any
unique event guide decisions when we emphasize
its uniqueness?" A unique event may guide our
decisions if we are prepared to examine the simi-
laritiesi between that event and others. If we
continue accumulating data before making a
decision, we shall not reach a decision; hence we
cannot obtain "all" the information.
I)ecisions are made by reference to information
that is considered relevant, and the individual
who is seen as unique is seen also as similar to
other unique individuals. Accordingly, persons
are dealt with in terms of the information which
the decision-maker thinks is relevant and in terms
of the similarities between individuals and not
in terms of "all" the information, nor in terms
of "uniqueness." Tihe process by which decision-
makers seek out information which they consider
relevant is important in a.ss.ssing Iheir decisions.
For a nmore extenckd discussion of the lproblem of
uniqueness as it applies to decisions about offenders,
see Wilkens, 'roblems in 'rediction Meihods: Ti
Unique Indrividual, in Tim SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME AND
DF..INQUFNeY (M. Wolfgang ed. 1962).
The means whereby decision-nakers process that
information into similariti., and differences is
equally important.
The statement, "each individual is unique,"
may be useful as a moral statement in the form,
"every individual should be treated as a unique
person"--individuality shouldl be res)ected. By
extensions, statements of this order can be related
to some of the basic concepts in the quality of
life we often refer to as "freedom." However, the
statement that each individual is unique may
better serve to indicate the limitations of our
knowledge and the restrictions on our decision-
making power, rather than as a basis for the dispen-
sation of justi6e. The idea of justice is another
moral concept related to the idea of fairness.
While the idea of justice seems to refer to some
external standard, the idea of fairness is essentially
a comparative assessment. This suggests a di-
lemma: we should proceed as though each in-
dividual were unique, and yet we should be "fair."
However, we cannot know what is fair unless we
are prepared to compare one individual with
another and to discuss similarties rather than
differences. Perhaps it is possible to approach the
judicial decision-making problems from the phe-
nomenological existentialist reference and avoid
some of these difficulties which may pertain more
to words than to processes.
SOiE EXPERIMIENTAL REsuLTS
It is impossible to watch the process whereby a
person recalls his past experiences and uses these
in making up his mind. It is )ossible, however, to
study the decision process when the relevant in-
formation is retrieved from a storehouse outside
the individual. There are many decisions which
fall within the second class. Perhaps the more
important decisions we make are those in which
information is sought by reference to external
records or other external sources. We may decide
which shirt to wear without asking for advice,
without statistical data as to the frequency of
the wearing of pink shirts, or even without the
second opinion of a wife. But we will tend to search
for data about yields before investing our money,
we will consider a few different vacancies before
accepting a l)articular job or we will refer to news-
papers before voting in an election. Judicial de-
cisions are usually related to documents and to
written sources of information.
There are very sound reasons for studying the
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judicial decision processes at this time.6 It has
been projected that the use of conventional files
will shortly be replaced by more efficient means.
Some claim that computer storage and retrieval
systems could now replace and improve upon all
conventional filing, storage, and retrieval systems.
An investigation of the possible consequences of
changing from files to computer retrieved parole
information display on a cathode ray tube was
undertaken. Decision-makers in the parole and
related processes are well accustomed to searching
through case papers for information which they
consider relevant to their decisions. Often the
material found in the files is checked or supple-
mented by information obtained by interviewing
the petitioner.
It is possible to simulate the computer of the
future by the use of random-access slide projection
equipment. This equipment can deal with only a
few cases, whereas a computer file would store
many thousands of records. Also, the slide pro-
jector is much slower in the recovery of any item
of information. Nonetheless, the decision-maker
may sit at a small console and call up information
at will which is displayed a second or two later on a
screen. The fully computerized system would
have access to any file and any item of information
in micro-seconds. Normally, however, one de-
cision is made about one case at any one time, and
the limitations of the slide projector in recovering
information only in respect of the case which is
loaded is not a serious mis-match with the pro-
jected computerized system. Using such apparatus,
it has been possible to ascertain certain preferences
which decision-makers have regarding the displays
of case materials and the kinds of decisions they
are likely to make under different conditions of
display.
Decision-makers differ not only in the decisions
they make, but also in the methods they use for
seeking information relating to their decisions.
For example, persons who are inclined to parole
6 The research discussed in this section is reported in
full in the sets of research reports prepared for the Law
Enforcemeit Assistance Administration funded Parole
Decision-making Project in which the Federal Parole
Board of the United States and the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency were involved with the writer
as co-director. Sets of the reports may be obtained on
request to the Research Center, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Davis, California.
In the first experiments, decisions were made after
reference to cards. A pilot study concerning probation
decisions is reported in: L. W1aMaNs, SociAL DEvIANcE
294 (1959).
petitioners are likely to select different kinds of
information than those who are more inclined to
deny parole. In experimental conditions, decision-
makers seem to prefer considerable redundancy in
the statements presented to them. Where the
information was presented in the form of correct
English sentence construction (e.g., this person
is 23 years of age), decision-makers were more
satisfied with the material than where the same
information was presented without the redundancy
of ordinary English construction (e.g., Age 23).
Furthermore, where the information was pre-
sented in the shorter form, decision-makers tended
to deny parole to the petitioner more frequently.
These data derive from simulated parole decision-
making conditions, but there seems to be little
doubt that the same kind of results would apply in
actual cases. It is possible that part of the difference
in the decision preference is due to parole boards'
greater familiarity with the narrative style of
report than with coded data. Thus, one might
suggest that if the shorter form of coded data were
presented for any period of time, a learning curve
might derive which would tend towards reduction
of the differences in the kinds of decisions under the
two conditions. Unfortunately, this seems un-
likely. Similar tests were made where the de-
cision-makers were persons very familiar with
coded information and similar differences in de-
cision outcomes by method of codification were
noted.
Experiments with groups have revealed very
little agreement as to which items in a case file are
most useful to consider first when there is pressure
to make a decision as soon as possible. Members
of the experimental groups are asked to vote for
the information they would require. The first
item to be called up on the screen (file) may at-
tract between one-quarter and one-third of the
persons present to vote to see it. The second item
reveals less agreement, and progressively fewer
and fewer persons agree as the number of items
increases. After the first three or four items have
been selected by a group, hardly better than
random frequencies can be attached to any of
the remaining items in a total file of just over 50
items. However, if members of a group vote for
the information they require and the four items
most often chosen are displayed, decision-makers
s It will be noted that it is unlikely that any one
member of the group will obtain exactly the four
items which he personally desired.
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have no difficulty in making an interim decision
whether or not to parole the -petitioner. On the
basis of the four items presented, it is then possible
to divide the decision-makers into two groups:
those who decided to grant parole, and those who
decided against parole. The two groups may then
be asked to vote separately for the next four items
of information which they would want to see dis-
played on any computerized file. In such experi-
ments little overlap has been found between the
items selected to be seen by the two different
groups. Persons who do select items also selected
by the other group are very likely to change their
decision regarding parole at the next opportunity.
In a majority of the experiments subjects have
been asked to rate both their confidence in the
decision when initially made (after four items)
and at each change thereafter. They have also
been asked to assess the difficulty of the decision-
making task at each point in the sequence. In
light of the theoretical discussion posed earlier
the results are extremely interesting. We postulated
that the level of confidence a decision-maker
would require depends upon the consequences he
assessed for the decision-the more serious the
probable consequences, the higher the level of
confidence required. Furthermore, we thought
that a low level of confidence might be easily
achieved by examining only a few items of infor-
mation, whereas a higher level of confidence would
require more activity and the processing of more
information, and hence could be said to be the
more difficult decision. All of the subjects in the
entire series of experiments to date, consisting of
parole board members, students in elementary
statistical classes, graduate students in research
methods and criminology, and others, provide
ratings which express the completely inverse re-
lationship between confidence and difficulty. As
expected, they claim that-their confidence in the
decision they make increases as the amount of
information they have seen increases. Although
free to select as much information as they desire,
decision-makers do not claim that the more
information they see the more difficult the de-
cision becomes; instead they claim that it becomes
easier in a direct relationship to their assessment
of their confidence By stating that a decision
in which they are confident is "easy" to reach
they seem to be saying that a decision in which
they have confidence is one with which they are
9 See, e.g., L. Wmxms, supra, note 7.
at ease; relating the subjective feeling of being
"at ease" to the subjective rating of "easiness"
as the opposite pole to "difficulty." The indi-
vidual decision-maker is not aware of the fact
that he is performing much more work as he
attempts to process more and more information.
Rather he believes, without exception, that the
processing of more and more information makes
decision-making easier. If one were to simulate
the human decision-making process on a com-
puter, the greater the level of confidence required,
the harder the computer would have to work.
We might reasonably say that the computer would
find this more difficult.
SomE INFERENCES PROM EXPERIMENTS
The experiments with the simulated computer
of the future have shown that different decision-
makers, given the facilities of an immediate-access
on-line information retrieval system geared to in-
dividual case material, would use the facility in
very different ways. It is also clear that the method
of presentation of the information (design of the
software of such systems) could have a consider-
able impact upon the nature and style of decision-
making. Almost any item in a case file is likely
to be requested in almost any sequence and at
any point in the decision-making process by
different decision-makers. Even if constraints are
imposed, so that all decision-makers see the same
information about the same case in exactly the
same form, different decisions will be given. More-
over, despite the very different strategies for in-
formation search and retrieval utilized by different
decision-makers, these different approaches can
result in the same conclusions. Different routes
can lead to the same end, and the same route can
lead to different ends.
ARE DECISION-MAKERS AS GOOD AS TmEY Tmn.K
THEY ARE?
The decision-makers' claim that they find the
processing of much data to be easier than the
processing of little is one of the most disturbing
findings. There may, however, be some general
relationship between the human performance of
any task and the assessment of its ease or diffi-
culty, and subjective feelings of how well the task
is done. It is well known that persons who drive
after an intake of alcohol feel that they are driving
better than they usually do. We are aware of
doing badly on aparticular task when the situation,
1973]
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material, or information becomes disorganized,10
but so long as a state of organization remains,
there may be little relationship between actual
performance and the subjective evaluation of the
performance by the individual performer. Feed-
back which conveys the message that the per-
former is "not doing well" is necessary, in some
form, before the performer will acknowledge this
as a fact. Thus, it seems likely that we may assess
our performance as "improving" the more work
we are doing (otherwise we would be unlikely to
invest the further effort), and we will continue to
believe in this improvement until we obtain feed-
back by information that the effort is not paying
off. There are interesting and important problems
with the decision-making process which are not
directly related to the quantity or quality of in-
formation, but rather to the subjective processing
of the data. The processing may be expected to
differ according to the different forms of retrieval
(e.g. sequence) and styles of presentation (e.g.
degree of codification).
An important question was raised at the outset
of this article. How much information can be
presented to the decision-maker without over-
loading him and deteriorating his performance in
the decision-making process? It seems from the
results of the experiments that it might be better
not to use the term "process" to cover the decision-
maker's search for and interpretation of informa-
tion, since we may see the "decision" as the termi-
nation of the information procurement and proc-
essing operation. If this form of explanation is
preferred, it seems that the termination of a
process is also a process, but of a different order
than that terminated. The decision to seek no
further information is a decision about informa-
tion, not a decision about the subject to which
the information relates. Thus, I may terminate
10 The perception of organization and disorganization
is another intriguing issue of persons and situations
which cannot now be developed.
" The argument at this point is closely related to the
well-known "paradox of the liar," believed to have been
devised by Eubulides about 350 B.C. For example, if I
say, "What I am now saying is a lie" can I be said to
be speaking truly or falsely? If I say the statement is
true, then as it states, it is false; if I say that it is false,
then, as it states, it is true. There are, of course, many
statements of this kind, such as "What this sentence
says cannot be proved." All these classes of statements
cannot be proved or disproved within the limits of the
language in which each is stated. K. POPPER, THE OPEN
SocrTY (1963), discusses this paradox and relates it to
similar problems such as that of the paradox of freedom
and the paradoxes of sovereignty.
the process of information search when I conclude
that no further useful information will be obtained,
or I may decide to make an interim decision, or
decide not to decide. A decision to make an in-
terim decision is a decision of low confidence in
the subject of the decision, but a decision of higher
confidence in the need for more information. It
follows that information which will lead me to a
satisfactory conclusion whether it is worth-while
to seek more information is information relating
to information, and not information relating to
the subject matter.
The problem of reconciling the subjective as-
sessments of "ease/difficulty" and "confidence"
make sense if this interpretation of the decision-
making operation is used. Decision-makers found
it easier to "make a decision" (i.e., to seek no
further information) when they had already
referred to a fairly large number of items. Decision-
making (or information search and analysis) is a
process which becomes easier to stop when a
respectable amount of work has been done, and
which is difficult to stop when only a few items
have been seen. Although this explanation makes
sense of the rating of subjects in the decision-
making experiments, it does not help us to regard
human decision-making as a more rational process.
If we accept the idea of a decision as the stopping
of a process, then it seems reasonable to ask about
the stopping rules, and to relate the stopping
procedures to the search procedures, since persons
"stop" with very different accumulations of in-
formation and acquire it in very different se-
quences. Furthermore, it seems improbable that
in the information search strategies of most de-
cision-makers there is any conscious effort to
collect information about information as well as
about the subject of the decision. More experi-
mentation is required to throw light on these
kinds of problems. The importance of informa-
tion about information will be quickly apparent
to one who is familiar with any forms of statistical
multivariate analysis. The problem of the overlap
of information is well-recognized and dealt with
in various kinds of statistical solutions. However,
it seems unlikely that human information process-
ing considers the correlations between items of
information, and correlated rather than uncor-
related items may be preferred.
Experiments have shown that the sequence in
which information is presented to decision-
makers, as well as the form of its presentation, is
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likely to influence the decisions, irrespective of
the content of the information. It has been shown
that probation officer decision-makers will con-
tinue to examine items of information well beyond
the point at which it is possible to remember them
or utilize them in a decision. It seems that where
the option is open, decision-makers will continue
to examine information until they reach a point
where they perceive that their organization of the
material has broken down-that is, the first point
at which there is feed-back to the performer that
his functioning has deteriorated.
Where individuals are permitted to seek any
information they wish, in any order they wish,
and to continue as long as they wish, some persons
will change their decisions after a large number of
items have been examined. However, although
may cases have been studied, no person has yet
12It is possible for the average person to remember
only some seven or eight numbers which may be dic-
tated to him. However, if a process, such as addition or
subtraction is specified, he can continue to process
numbers according to the rules of combination well
beyond the number of items he can remember. The rules
of addition or subtraction are methods for disposing of
information as it arrives in a sequential form. If in-
formation is processed according to some sequential
process or another, then clearly much information can
be processed; however, it can only be processed if a
rule is stated which enables the sequential disposal of
the information to be put into effect. Thus it seems
important to know the "rules" of procedure which
decision-makers use in the processing of information by
means of their own mental faculties. It may be that in
addition to some sequential processes for disposal of
information the human intelligence can turn items into
patterns and deal with materials in that form. Thus we
may be able to sum a series of numbers and remember
at each stage only the cumulative sum to that point.
Many persons will remember playing with typewriter
characters to form patterns by superimposition of
characters such as:/G),/, /, -, and will know that a
line of these superimposed forms looks like a row of
soldiers, and may be remembered as such. When it
may be required to recall the characters we might work
out the items from the remembered pattern. However,
in the superimposition rule we have lost the sequence
information. Rules which enable the recapture or use of
more than a few items of information, while facilitating
recall, in some regards results in a loss of some informa-
tion; the kind of loss is related to the kind of rule. Thus,
in the examples, the rule of addition results in the loss
of items as individual digits, their sequence and fre-
quency; the rule of superimposition to achieve pattern
results in the loss of sequence.
stopped the search and settled for a decision at
any later time which was different from that de-
cided before the eighth item of information.
It is apparent that decision-makers who believe
that they can consider all the relevant information
are deceiving themselves. It is also clear that
computer salesmen who try to persuade managers
that "if only they could have the information
at their finger-tips their problems would be solved,"
have too simplistic an idea of information search
and utilization in decision-making. Much is un-
known regarding the relationship between the
human user and the computer. Computer informa-
tion systems present us with a new set of problems
in man-machine relationships, and these relation-
ships are of a different order from prior man-
machine relationships.
TAm PiECE
As the visitor enters Cranfield Aeronautical
College he may see a large mural. It shows a
vaguely human-looking beast operating a center
lathe; one arm is longer than the other, the trunk
and legs are of extraordinary proportions, and
the impression is of a humanesque monster of
grotesque physique. The caption under the drawing
states that for many years members of the College
had tried to persuade the manufacturer of center
lathes to design a lathe suitable for human opera-
tion, but having become disillusioned had taken
up a different "project-designing an operator
for the machine. Are we going to have as much
trouble with the design of machines which assist
us in our logical functions as we have had, and
still have, in the design of machinery to assist in
our physical operations? Man may more readily
adapt his mind to the "information" machines
than his body to the "physical" machines. There is
no danger of "the machines taking over", but
there are dangers from machine designers exerting
much more influence than even they themselves
are aware of.
Buyers beware. To beware, be informed. To be
informed, investigate. To investigate, invest in
and become involved in research.
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